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A. WRITTEN SPECIFICATION OF REASONS FOR NEW TRIAL ORDERS
La Manna v. Stewart.1 The California Supreme Court once again
warned trial judges that it will require full and timely compliance with
Code of Civil Procedure section 657, which contains detailed statutory
provisions governing the issuance of new trial orders.2 Despite the court's
1. 13 Cal. 3d 413, 530 P.2d 1073, 118 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1975) (Mosk, J.)
(unanimous decision).
2. The statute reads as follows:
The verdict may be vacated and any other decision may be modified or va-
cated, in whole or in part, and a new or further trial granted on all or part
of the issues, on the application of the party aggrieved, for any of the following
causes, materially affecting the substantial rights of such party:
1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any
order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented
from having a fair trial.
2. Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have
been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on
any question submitted to them by the court, by a resort to the determination
of chance, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the
jurors.
3. Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against.
4. Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application,
which he could not, with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced
at the trial.
5. Excessive or inadequate damages.
6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or the
verdict or other decision is against law.
7. Error in law, occurring at the trial and excepted to by the party making
the application.
When a new trial is granted, on all or part of the issues, the court shall specify
the ground or grounds upon which it is granted and the court's reason or rea-
sons for granting the new trial upon each ground stated.
A new trial shall not be granted upon the ground of insufficiency of the evi-
dence to justify the verdict or other decision, nor upon the ground of excessive
or inadequate damages, unless after weighing the evidence the court is con-
vinced from the entire record, including reasonable inferences therefrom, that
the court or jury clearly should have reached a different verdict or decision.
The order passing upon and determining the motion must be made and entered
as provided in Section 660 and if the motion is granted must state the ground
or grounds relied upon by the court, and may contain the specification of rea-
sons. If an order granting such motion does not contain such specification of
reasons, the court must, within 10 days after filing such order, prepare, sign
and file such specification of reasons in writing with the clerk. The court shall
not direct the attorney for a party to prepare either or both said order and said
specification of reasons.
On appeal from an order granting a new trial the order shall be affirmed if
it should have been granted upon any ground stated in the motion, whether
or not specified in the order or specification of reasons, except that (a) the
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earlier decision in Mercer v. Perez,3 which also required compliance
with section 657, there had been considerable appellate litigation prior
to La Manna concerning both section 657 and improperly prepared new
trial orders. Even after La Manna, however, the litigants who suffer
when a judge issues a new trial order that is reversed because of
noncompliance with section 657 have no remedy for the judge's failure
to perform his duty. The hardship is especially unfair to diligent
litigants who specifically request that the judge comply with section 657.
This Note will first examine section 657 and the judicial treatment
of the section which preceded La Manna. Next, the principal case will
be analyzed. Finally, a possible legislative solution to the problem of
the litigant left without remedy will be proposed.
I. New Trial Orders and Section 657
Section 657 requires the trial court to specify in the new trial order
the grounds on which a new trial is granted. If the order does not
contain a specification of reasons supporting the grounds for new trial,
the court must prepare such specifications within 10 days after the filing
of the new trial order. If the ground on which the new trial order is
based is either insufficiency of the evidence or excessive or inadequate
damages, 5 the order cannot be affirmed on appeal unless the above
order shall not be affirmed upon the ground of the insufficiency of the evi-
dence to justify the verdict or other decision, or upon the ground of excessive
or inadequate damages, unless such ground is stated in the order granting the
motion and (b) on appeal from an order granting a new trial upon the ground
of the insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or
upon the ground of excessive or inadequate damages, it shall be conclusively
presumed that said order as to such ground was made only for the reasons spe-
cified in said order or said specification of reasons, and such order shall be
reversed as to such ground only if there is no substantial basis in the record
for any of such reasons.
CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 657 (West Supp. 1975).
3. 68 Cal. 2d 104, 436 P.2d 315, 65 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1968).
4. Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45
(1973); Jones v. Citrus Motors Ontario, Inc., 8 Cal. 3d 706, 505 P.2d 220, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 28 (1973); Miller v. County Flood Control Dist., 8 Cal. 3d 689, 505 P.2d 193, 106
Cal. Rptr. 1 (1973); Scala v. Jerry Witt & Sons, Inc., 3 Cal. 3d 359, 475 P.2d 864, 90
Cal. Rptr. 592 (1970); Mercer v. Perez, 68 Cal. 2d 104, 436 P.2d 315, 65 Cal. Rptr. 315
(1968).
In the first 9 months of 1975 new trial orders were reversed in four California
Court of Appeal decisions because of the trial judge's noncompliance with section 657.
Worden v. Gentry, 50 Cal. App. 3d 600, 123 Cal. Rptr. 496 (2d Dist. 1975); Devine v.
Murrieta, 49 Cal. App. 3d 855, 122 Cal. Rptr. 847 (2d Dist. 1975); Previte v.
Lincolnwood, Inc., 48 Cal. App. 3d 976, 122 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1st Dist. 1975); Krueger v.
Meyer, 48 Cal. App. 3d 760, 121 Cal. Rptr. 814 (3d Dist. 1975). A new trial order was
affirmed in McKenzie v. Memorial Hosp., 50 Cal. App. 3d 977, 123 Cal. Rptr. 855 (2d
Dist. 1975) after a discussion of the requirements of section 657.
5. Section 657 distinguishes these grounds, where the trial judge acts as a
thirteenth juror, from the other grounds upon which a new trial order can be based. A
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requirements are met. Section 657 also prohibits the judge from direct-
ing the attorney for either party to prepare the order or specification of
reasons.
0
The specification of reasons requirement of section 657 fulfills two
purposes.7 The first purpose is to encourage careful judicial review of
new trial orders. Much discretion is given the trial court in ruling on a
motion for new trial on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence. The
judge may disbelieve witnesses, reweigh evidence, and draw reasonable
inferences from the evidence that are contrary to inferences drawn by
the jury. On review, all presumptions are in favor of the new trial order
as against the jury verdict, and the order will be reversed only on a
showing of manifest and unmistakable abuse of the trial court's discre-
tion.8 For this reason it is necessary that the trial court's broad powers
be exercised only after serious deliberation. It is thought that a trial
judge will take greater care in granting a new trial order if he has to
specify the reasons for granting it. The objective of encouraging serious
judicial deliberation of new trial orders is furthered by the requirement
that the judge may not direct the attorneys to prepare either the new trial
order or the specification of reasons.'
Second, the specification of reasons requirement makes the right to
appeal from the order more meaningful by narrowing the scope of
appellate review. Because the trial judge exercises broad discretion in
issuing a new trial order on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence,
it is important to the successful prosecution of an appeal that the reasons
for granting the order be specified. If an appellant could not know-
from examining the trial court's specification of reasons-in what re-
spects the trial judge found the evidence insufficient, it would be diffi-
new trial order must be affirmed on appeal if it should have been granted on any ground
stated in the motion other than insufficiency of the evidence or excessive or inadequate
damages. Although a trial judge is required by section 657 to specify his reasons for
granting a new trial-on the ground of, for example, errors in law-his failure to do so
does not prevent the moving party from showing an appellate court why the order should
be affirmed. Treber v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 128, 436 P.2d 330, 65 Cal. Rptr. 330
(1968); People v. Hunt, 2 Cal. App. 3d 158, 82 Cal. Rptr. 546 (lst Dist. 1969).
6. An appellate court cannot affirm a new trial order on the ground of insuffi-
ciency of the evidence if the order is prepared by an attorney instead of the judge.
Worden v. Gentry, 50 Cal. App. 3d 600, 123 Cal. Rptr. 496 (2d Dist. 1975); BART v.
McKeegan, 265 Cal. App. 2d 263, 71 Cal. Rptr. 204 (lst Dist. 1968).
7. These purposes are discussed in Mercer v. Perez, 68 Cal. 2d 104, 436 P.2d 315,
65 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1968).
8. Id. at 112, 436 P.2d at 320, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 320; Malkasian v. Irwin, 61 Cal.
2d 738, 394 P.2d 822, 40 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1964); Yarrow v. State, 53 Cal. 2d 427, 348
P.2d 687, 2 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1960); Brandelius v. City & County of San Francisco, 47
Cal. 2d 729, 306 P.2d 432 (1957); Christian v. Bolls, 7 Cal. App. 3d 408, 86 Cal. Rptr.
545 (4th Dist. 1970).
9. Mercer v. Perez, 68 Cal. 2d 104, 113, 436 P.2d 315, 321, 65 Cal. Rptr. 315,
321 (1968).
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cult to demonstrate to an appellate court that the evidence was in fact
sufficient and that the trial court had abused its discretion by granting
the new trial order. Absent a specification of reasons an appellate court
would be required to search the record for any insufficiency that would
support the new trial order; and in such a search the appellate court
might consider insufficiencies totally unrelated to those found by the
trial judge. When it is remembered that the trial judge can disbelieve
witnesses and consider factors that are not part of the record in ruling on
a motion for new trial on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, it
is apparent that unless the trial judge specifies his reasons for ordering a
new trial, the right to appeal his order is of little practical significance.
Section 657 thus encourages careful judicial review of new trial
orders and narrows an appellate court's scope of review of a new trial
order issued on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence so that only
those reasons specified within 10 days of the issuance of the order are
considered.
ii. Construction and Application of Section 657 Before La Manna
In Mercer v. Perez,'0 the court interpreted the section 657 require-
ment that the specification of reasons be filed within 10 days of the new
trial order as a statute of limitations restricting the trial court's jurisdic-
tion. An attempt to file a specification of reasons after the 10-day
period had elapsed was held void as in excess of that jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the court determined that to adopt a policy of remanding
cases to trial judges so that they might file late specifications of reasons
would frustrate the two purposes of the specification of reasons require-
ment."- If on remand a trial judge could correct his failure to file a
specification of reasons, his incentive to deliberate carefully before
granting the new trial would be reduced. Moreover, if a trial judge
initially failed to file an adequate specification of reasons, the party
appealing the new trial order would have to prosecute a preliminary
appeal to obtain the judge's reasons for the order before appealing the
order on the merits. In short, effective review of new trial orders would
be hindered. Therefore, the court in Mercer insisted on full and timely
compliance with the requirements of section 657.12
10. 68 Cal. 2d 104, 436 P.2d 315, 65 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1968).
11. Id. at 123, 436 P.2d at 328, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 328. See text accompanying
notes 7-10 supra.
12. Many California decisions have followed the principles set down in Mercer.
Several have dealt with the adequacy of the specificiation of reasons. In Scala v. Jerry
Witt & Sons, Inc., 3 Cal. 3d 359, 475 P.2d 864, 90 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1970), the court held
that a specification of reasons phrased in terms of "ultimate facts" is not adequate. The
specification of reasons must do more than restate the ground for the new trial order; it
must identify the part of the record that convinces the trial judge that the jury should
1976]
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In Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co.18 the court reversed a new trial
order based on excessive damages because the specification of reasons
was inadequate. The court held that remarks by the trial judge during
oral argument on the motion for new trial may not satisfy the specifica-
tion of reasons requirement of section 657. The court stressed that
section 657 requires that the specification of reasons be in the new
trial order itself or in a separate document signed by the trial judge and
filed with the clerk within 10 days of the filing of the order.14  It also
emphasized section 657's purpose-facilitating appellate review-and
stated that this purpose would be frustrated if an appellant challenging
a new trial order were required to search the trial judge's statements,
as contained in the record, to locate possible reasons for the new trial
order."'5
As can be seen, the California Supreme Court had clearly an-
nounced in cases preceding La Manna that it would require trial judges
to adhere strictly to the provisions of section 657. It was against this
background that the court examined the facts of La Manna.
III. The Facts in La Manna
La Manna arose out of an accident in which the plaintiff was
have reached a different verdict, so that appellate review of the new trial order is
facilitated. The specification of reasons in Scala stated only that while the evidence was
not sufficient to show that the defendant was negligent, it was sufficient to show that the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent. This specification was not adequate because it did
not narrow the issues so as to make appellate review of the new trial order feasible.
In Miller v. County Flood Control District, 8 Cal. 3d 689, 505 P.2d 193, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1973), the court reversed a new trial order issued on the ground of insufficiency
of the evidence because the specification of reasons was not adequate to permit
meaningful review of the order. Additional reasons for granting the new trial were,
however, stated in another section of the trial court's order which dealt with the denial of
a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. But the court refused to consider
these reasons on appeal because the specification of reasons in the new trial order did
not refer to them. It decided that the purpose of section 657-facilitation of appellate
review-was furthered by requiring all the reasons to be set out in the specification of
reasons; therefore, the court chose to limit its review to those reasons. See also Previte
v. Linconwood, Inc., 48 Cal. App. 3d 976, 122 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1st Dist. 1975); Van
Zee v. Bayview Hardware Store, 268 Cal. App. 2d 351, 74 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1st Dist.
1968).
13. 9 Cal. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973).
14. Section 657 provides in part:
The order passing upon and determining the motion must be made and
entered as provided in Section 660 and if the motion is granted must state the
ground or grounds relied upon by the court, and may contain the specification
of reasons. If an order granting such motion does not contain such specifica-
tion of reasons, the court must, within 10 days after filing such order, prepare,
sign and file such specification of reasons in writing with the clerk. The court
shall not direct the attorney for a party to prepare either or both said order
and said specification of reasons.
CAL. CoDE Civ. PRo. § 657 (West Supp. 1975).
15. 9 Cal. 3d at 62, 507 P.2d at 659, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
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struck by the defendant's car while she was crossing an intersection in a
marked crosswalk. The defendant denied negligence and raised the
defense of contributory negligence, and, the jury returned a verdict for
the defendant.
The plaintiff moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and
for a new trial on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence. The
court denied the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; but it
granted the motion for new trial, orally specifying from the bench its
reasons for doing so.16 Nevertheless, these reasons were not specified in
the written minute order filed by the court later that day. Four days
later, the plaintiff filed a memorandum with the trial court, bringing to
the court's attention the requirement that it file a written specification of
its reasons for granting a new trial order. Accompanying the memoran-
dum was a 3-page specification of reasons supporting the order pre-
pared by the plaintiff for the court's consideration. In spite of the
efforts of plaintiff's counsel, however, the court did not file a written
specification of reasons until after the period for compliance with section
657 had expired.17
16. The trial judge stated:
The specifications of some of the reasons are that the defendant was
clearly negligent. He did violate the pedestrian right of way in the crosswalk
and the negligence was a proximate cause of the injury to the Plaintiff and
she was injured. The Plaintiff herself, Aida La Manna, was not in any man-
ner negligent. She did use ordinary care as she walked across the street, and
there is no substantial evidence whatsoever that she was negligent. She did
walk across seven lanes, and I believe there were seven-(interruption by de-
fense counsel) Seventy-seven feet. She was about almost there, anyway, and
there was no place of safety. She didn't dart. She didn't make any sudden
movements. She was walking along minding her own business. She thought
she was home, but when she was hit her conduct was normal. She did all that
was expected of her. She did not walk into the car and she did not walk or
blunder into the car, and that is the end of the order.
13 Cal. 3d at 417 n.1, 530 P.2d at 1075 n.1, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 763 n.1.
17. Section 657 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires the trial judge to prepare,
sign and file a specification of reasons in writing with the clerk within 10 days of the
filing of the new trial order. Section 660 requires the trial judge to rule on a motion for
new trial within 60 days of the mailing of the notice of entry of judgment to the parties
(or of service on the moving party of notice of the entry of judgment, if this is earlier; or
if no notice of entry of judgment has been given, within 60 days after the filing of notice
of intention to move for new trial). The effect of a failure to rule on a new trial motion
within the 60-day period is a denial of the motion. CAL. CODE Cv. PRO. § 660 (West
Supp. 1975).
In La Manna the trial judge filed a written minute order granting the motion for
new trial 35 days after the mailing of notice of the entry of judgment. The order
contained neither the grounds nor a specification of reasons supporting the order.
No further action was taken by the trial court until 57 days later (102 days after the
mailing of notice of the entry of judgment), when the court filed a nunc pro tunc minute
order, which purported to amend the earlier order by adding a transcript of the oral
statement of reasons the judge had given when he granted the motion for new trial from
the bench. The nunc pro tunc order had no effect because it was made after the
expiration of both the 10-day period of section 657 and the 60-day period of section 660.
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The California Supreme Court reversed the new trial order because
the trial court had failed to state in writing its reasons for granting the
new trial within 10 days of the filing of the order, as required by section
657. In order to avoid a miscarriage of justice, however, the court also
reversed the judgment for the defendant. It found the defendant negli-
gent as a matter of law and found the evidence insufficient to support a
finding that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent.18
IV. The Court's Analysis in La Manna
The defendant urged reversal of the new trial order on the ground
that the trial judge had failed to satisfy the written specification of rea-
sons requirement of section 657. The plaintiff, in support of the new
trial order, argued that the trial judge's action had been in substantial
compliance with section 657 and that the plaintiff's efforts to secure the
trial judge's compliance with section 657 should have relieved her of the
consequences of the judge's omission.
The California Supreme Court responded to the plaintiff's substan-
tial compliance argument by noting that section 657 explicitly requires a
written specification of reasons. The fact that the two-fold purpose of
the specification of reasons 9 might be met by an oral statement by the
trial judge was found unpersuasive. According to the court, although
the test for determining whether the content of a specification of reasons
is adequate is whether the two-fold purpose of the requirement is
satisfied, the form of the specification of reasons is governed by the
express provisions of section 657.20 The court concluded that an oral
statement of reasons cannot amount to compliance with section 657's
directive that the specification of reasons be in writing. In so doing it
13 Cal. 3d at 418, 530 P.2d at 1076, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 764. Siegal v. Superior Court,
68 Cal. 2d 97, 436 P.2d 311, 65 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1968). See also Treber v. Superior
Court, 68 Cal. 2d 128, 135, 436 P.2d 330, 335, 65 Cal. Rptr. 330, 335 (1968); Mercer
v. Perez, 68 Cal. 2d 104, 121, 436 P.2d 315, 326, 65 Cal. Rptr. 315, 326 (1968).
18. The plaintiff was hit by defendant's car as she was crossing an intersection in
a marked crosswalk. The defendant testified that he noticed a car approaching the
intersection from his right as he drove toward the intersection. He took his eyes off the
road to watch the car to make sure that it halted at the stop sign; he did not turn back to
see the plaintiff in the crosswalk until it was too late to avoid her. The court found that
the defendant had violated section 21950(a) of the Vehicle Code, which requires
motorists to yield the right of way to pedestrians in marked crosswalks. The court
therefore found that the defendant's conduct constituted negligence as a matter of law.
The court also found that the defendant could not satisfy his burden of proving that the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent because he did not see her before the accident. The
court's decision in La Manna was controlled by Schmitt v. Henderson, 1 Cal. 3d 460, 462
P.2d 30, 82 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1969); Novak v. Dewar, 55 Cal. 2d 749, 361 P.2d 709, 13
Cal. Rptr. 101 (1961); and Gray v. Brinkerhoff, 41 Cal. 2d 180, 258 P.2d 834 (1953).
19. See text accompanying notes 7-10 supra.
20. 13 Cal. 3d at 423, 530 P.2d at 1079, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
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relied heavily on Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co.21  Other decisions where
incomplete but substantial compliance with section 657's requirements
was found to suffice were distinguished because they involved written
specifications of reasons.22
The court's answer to the plaintiff's claim that litigants who re-
quest judicial compliance with section 657 should not be penalized for
the trial court's failure to comply was that the trial judge alone is
responsible for compliance with section 657. While the attorney may
remind the judge of the requirements of section 657, it is the judge's
duty to see that those requirements are met. The justices believed that
if the court were to allow the efforts of an attorney to excuse a judge's
omission, the responsibility for compliance with section 657 would be
shifted from judges to attorneys. The court refused to sanction any
such shift of responsibility. It flatly declared:
In view of the plain statutory directive that "the court" shall specify
the reasons for granting a new trial, the fatal omission of such a speci-
fication cannot be filled by any act of counsel or party.23
V. Implications of La Manna
The need for compliance with section 657 in the interests of
judicial efficiency is clear, and the holding of La Manna was obviously
21. 9 Cal. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973). See text accompanying
notes 13-15 supra.
22. 13 Cal. 3d at 422, 530 P.2d at 1079, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
The court discussed Herman v. Shandor, 8 Cal. App. 3d 476, 87 Cal. Rptr. 443 (5th
Dist. 1970) and Desherow v. Rhodes, 1 Cal. App. 3d 733, 82 Cal. Rptr. 138 (2d Dist.
1969). In Herman the trial judge granted an oral motion for new trial; however, the
judge's action was a nullity because section 659 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires
written notice of the motion for new trial to be filed with the clerk and served on the
adverse party. Subsequently, the requirements of sections 659 and 660 were met and the
trial judge again granted the motion for new trial. However, the judge had already filed
a written specification of reasons after the oral motion for new trial. In granting the
second motion the judge adopted those reasons and both parties agreed in court that it
was unnecessary for the trial judge to file another specification of reasons in order to
comply with section 657. Although section 657 requires that the specification of reasons
be contained in the new trial order or be filed within 10 days after the issuance of the
new trial order, the court in Herman held that there was "substantial compliance" with
section 657 and affirmed the new trial order.
In Desherow, a motion for new trial was heard on the 60th day following notice of
entry of judgment. The judge granted the motion and directed the clerk of the court to
enter the written minute order granting the new trial in the permanent minutes of the
court on that same day. The clerk did not place a file entry stamp on the minute order
until 2 days later and it was contended that the new trial order did not satisfy section
660's requirement that the new trial order be entered in the permanent minutes of the
court within 60 days of notice of entry of judgment. The court decided that the clerk's
failure to stamp the new trial order in time was merely clerical nonfeasance and refused
to allow this deficiency to invalidate the new trial order. Desherow contains a lengthy
discussion of the development of the doctrine of substantial compliance.
23. 13 Cal. 3d at 424, 530 P.2d at 1080, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
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compelled by the explicit language of section 657. Nevertheless, the
case is subject to criticism on two grounds. First, a necessary result of
the California Supreme Court's effort to avoid a miscarriage of justice
was an apparent disregard of the policies underlying section 657's
specification of reasons requirement. Even more important, however,
was the court's failure to provide a remedy for the diligent litigant
injured by a judge's failure to fulfill the obligations of his office.
The two policies behind section 657-careful trial court delibera-
tion and efficient appellate review-were clearly satisfied by the sub-
stantial compliance of the trial judge in La Manna, but the supreme
court departed from these policies in its decision and instead exalted
form over substance. It is clear from the trial judge's oral specification
of the reasons for granting the new trial order2 4 that he did carefully
consider the verdict. And the supreme court, contrary to the policy of
section 657, undoubtedly searched the record in order to find evidence
to support its determination that the defendant was negligent as a matter
of law.25
Most significant, however, was the court's apparent failure to note
the injustice caused by the moving party's lack of remedy for the trial
judge's failure to comply with section 657. In cases such as La Manna,
the judge's omission is the clear cause of an injury-a judgment against
the moving party-but the judge is given absolute immunity from suit.20
The law of torts thus provides no incentive for a judge to comply with
section 657. All the moving party can do is remind the judge of the
clear command of section 657. When, as in La Manna, these efforts
are unsuccessful, the moving party has no way to protect himself from
the consequences of the court's failure to fulfill the duties imposed by
the legislature and the responsibilities attending judicial office.
Ultimately, the signficance of La Manna is unclear. It reaffirmed
the supreme court's requirement of strict compliance with section 657,
but in so doing it ignored the policies behind the rule itself. Although
the court's reversal on the merits achieved a just result in La Manna, the
ad hoc remedy of appellate reversal on the merits is not always available.
24. See note 16 supra.
25. 13 Cal. 3d at 425, 530 P.2d at 1081, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 769. The court
apparently considered the merits without noting the inconsistency with the policy of
section 657. There is no reference in the opinion to the reasons for doing so; there is no
express approval or disapproval for appellate review of the record in similar subsequent
cases. Therefore, whether the court has approved the remedy of appellate search of the
record is unclear. It is also unclear whether such remedy, if it is to be used at all, should
be used only in cases of extreme hardship to the party favored by the order-cases in
which the party favored by the order has requested the trial court's compliance with
section 657 in order to protect the new trial order.
26. W. PRossER, LAw OF TORTS 987-88 (4th ed. 1971); 4 B. WMN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORqlA LAw 2456-59 (8th ed. 1974).
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Thus, in cases involving facts that are less dramatic than those in La
Manna, reversal may be denied and judicially injured litigants may
suffer. Because judicial deference to the command of the legislature
dictated the result in La Manna, relief from the potential unfairness
inherent in section 657 must be provided by the legislature.
VI. A Proposal For Legislative Change
The legislature could deal with the problem posed by La Manna by
providing for a writ of mandamus to compel the trial judge's compliance
with the specification of reasons requirement of section 657. Obviously
only the party granted a new trial order should be given the right to seek
the writ, as the writ procedure should not be used as a means of
providing an unsuccessful litigant with expedited appellate review.
There are only two possible grounds for the proposed writ. First,
the party receiving the new trial could urge the trial court's complete
failure to comply with section 657's requirements as a basis for invoking
the writ. This was the situation presented in La Manna. Second, the
party who obtains a new trial order could seek the writ in order to
obtain protection from an insufficient specification of reasons. The first
basis for the writ would not involve resolution of any significant legal
issues-the appellate court would simply compel the trial court to fulfill
its duty to the aggrieved litigant. The second basis, however, might
raise more difficult legal questions, since the appellate court might be
required to evaluate the legal sufficiency of the trial judge's specification
of reasons.
In order to eliminate the possibility that the extraordinary writ
procedure would be abused by litigants seeking what would amount to
an expedited appeal, issuance of a writ of mandamus to review the
sufficiency of a trial court's specification of reasons would have to be
limited to the situations where the judge failed, on the face of the written
specification, to state sufficient reasons for granting the new trial order.
This limitation would prevent litigants who obtained a new trial from
using the writ procedure to compel the trial court to buttress its reasons,
and would limit use of the writ to those situations in which the specifica-
tion suffered from formal or facial defects. In addition, this limitation
would probably be compelled by the doctrine that mandamus may not
be used to control a court's exercise of its discretion. 7 Mandamus may,
however, be used to compel the exercise of a judge's discretion. 28  Thus,
compelling a judge to prepare a formally sufficient specification of
27. See, e.g., Faulkner v. Toll Bridge Authority, 40 Cal. 2d 317, 253 P.2d 659
(1953); Palmer v. Fox, 118 Cal. App. 2d 453, 258 P.2d 30 (2d Dist. 1953).
28. Frank, Mandamus, in CALIFORNIA CIVm Wgrrs § 5.30 (1970).
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reasons would not be objectionable-it would not involve control of
discretion.
Mandamus could be used in the case in which a specification of
reasons contained a formal or facial defect that could be shown to be
fatally prejudicial to the grant of a new trial. Mandamus can be used
to remedy an abuse of discretion;29 and it should be obvious that failure
to cure unnecessary formal insufficiency in a specification of reasons for
a new trial order amounts to an abuse of discretion. 30 If, on the other
hand, it could not be demonstrated that the defects amounted to prej-
udicial formal legal insufficiency, the writ would not issue-appeal by
the party who received the verdict would determine the correctness on
the merits of the grant of a new trial. In deciding whether to issue the
writ, an appellate court would need to consider only whether the easily
verifiable written specifications requirement of section 657 had been
met. The correctness of the trial judge's grant of a new trial would not
be placed in issue if a writ was sought. Since issuance of the writ would
not require an examination of the trial record, expedited determination
could be had. The legislature could provide a short interval, after the
10-day period for the filing of the specification of reasons had expired,
during which a litigant could seek the writ. Similarly, expedited ap-
pellate decision on the petition could be required. The speed with
which appellate determination could be obtained would minimize the
possibility that the writ procedure would be abused as a means of delay.
Although it is true that the responsibility of seeking the writ would be
placed on the litigant, it is believed that this inconsistency with the
presently expressed policy of section 657 would be outweighed by the
benefits of providing a remedy to the litigant injured by a trial judge's
noncompliance with section 657. During the time that a return on the
writ was pending, the trial judge would, of course, be allowed to modify
the new trial order or specification of reasons so that they would com-
ply with section 657.
Conclusion
Although the California Supreme Court's decision in La Manna v.
Stewart reaffirmed the need for trial court compliance with the require-
ments of Code of Civil Procedure section 657, it overlooked the injus-
tices created when trial court judges fail to provide written specifications
29. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 2d 428, 304
P.2d 13 (1956).
30. "In a legal sense discretion is abused whenever in the exercise of its discretion
the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all the circumstances before it being considered."
Id. at 432, 304 P.2d at 15, quoting Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 669, 672, 169 P.2d
453, 456 (2d Dist. 1946).
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of their reasons for granting new trial orders. Given that the language
of section 657 may have compelled the result in La Manna, legislative
action is urged to correct the potential injustice inherent in the present
statute.
The proposed statutory amendment would encourage fulfillment of
the two purposes of section 657--encouraging careful judicial review of
new trial orders, and narrowing the scope of appellate review-because
it would provide a means by which litigants could compel judicial
compliance with that section. A trial judge who failed to deliberate
carefully before ordering a new trial, or who did not specify sufficient
reasons to adequately narrow the scope of appellate review of the new
trial order, would receive a writ from an appellate court ordering him to
do so. It is hoped that the existence of such a remedy for litigants
would both eliminate the necessity for its use and reduce the number of
appeals of new trial orders.
Chuck Adams
B. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF GRAND JURY REPORTS
People v. Superior Court.1 In this case the California Supreme
Court faced the question whether a superior court must accept and file
every report submitted by a grand jury. The court held that a superior
court may refuse to file a report extending beyond the grand jury's legal
authority. This holding raises important questions about the scope of a
grand jury's powers and the standards to be used by superior courts in
reviewing grand jury reports in the future.
I. Factual Summary
On the basis of evidence presented before it, the 1972 Santa
Barbara County Grand Jury submitted to the superior court an "Interim
Report" describing alleged misconduct of the county pathologist and
setting forth recommendations for procedural changes in the administra-
tion of the county hospital's pathology department.' The presiding
judge, believing that the interim report did not satisfy applicable legal
standards,3 ordered the interim report sealed and directed the grand jury
1. 13 Cal. 3d 430, 531 P.2d 761, 119 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1975) (Tobriner, J.) (4-3
decision).
2. Id. at 434, 531 P.2d at 763, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 195. The facts were not dis-
puted.
3. At a meeting with the grand jury, the presiding judge emphasized that a grand
jury report which directs serious accusations at a specified individual "'castigates him,
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